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Delay discounting refers to the reduction of the value of a future reward as the delay to that
reward increases. The rate at which individuals discount future rewards varies as a func-
tion of both individual and contextual differences, and high delay discounting rates have
been linked with problematic behaviors, including drug abuse and gambling. The current
study investigated the effects of acute anticipatory stress on delay discounting, while con-
sidering two important factors: individual perceptions of stress and whether the stressful
situation is future-focused or present-focused. Half of the participants experienced acute
stress by anticipating giving a videotaped speech. This stress was either future-oriented
(speech about future job) or present-oriented (speech about physical appearance). They
then performed a delay discounting task, in which they chose between smaller, immediate
rewards, and larger, delayed rewards.Their scores on the Perceived Stress Scale were also
collected. The way in which one appraises stressful situations interacts with acute stress
to influence choices; under stressful conditions, delay discounting rate was highest in indi-
viduals with low trait perceived stress and lowest for individuals with high trait perceived
stress. This result might be related to individual variation in reward responsiveness under
stress. Furthermore, the time orientation of the task interacted with its stressfulness to
affect the individual’s propensity to choose immediate rewards. These findings add to our
understanding of the intermediary factors between stress and decision-making.
Keywords: delay discounting, stress, decision-making, future orientation, perceived stress
INTRODUCTION
Delay discounting refers to the tendency for individuals to prefer
immediate rewards over rewards received after a delay, even if the
magnitude of the delayed reward is larger (Kirby et al., 1999; Berns
et al., 2007). This tendency can often be maladaptive when mak-
ing intertemporal choices; for example, one might choose to forego
future health in order to enjoy the immediate pleasure afforded by
fatty foods. While most individuals exhibit some degree of delay
discounting, the rate at which people discount future rewards can
vary widely from individual to individual, and even from context
to context (Peters and Buchel, 2011). For instance, many studies
have shown that drug addicts have higher discounting rates than
non-drug users (Kirby et al., 1999; Kirby and Petry, 2004; Businelle
et al., 2010), and people from Western cultures have higher dis-
counting rates than those from Eastern cultures (Takahashi et al.,
2009). Contextual influences on delay discounting rate include
a gambling context among pathological gamblers (Dixon et al.,
2006) and episodic future thinking in normal subjects (Peters and
Buchel, 2010; Benoit et al., 2011).
Given that many important decisions are made under stressful
circumstances, our aim in the present study is to determine the
effect of acute stress on delay discounting rate. A few studies have
begun to investigate how stress might influence decision-making
about delayed rewards and uncertain rewards. Participants under
stress have been shown to make more risky choices in a risk-taking
paradigm (Porcelli and Delgado, 2009), and exogenous cortisol
administration has been shown to increase risk-seeking (Putman
et al., 2010). While these findings point to more risky decision-
making under stress, which may translate to higher delay discount-
ing, high basal cortisol levels have actually been associated with less
risky behavior on the Iowa Gambling Task (van Honk et al., 2003),
as well as with lower delay discounting rates (Takahashi, 2004).
Stress has also been found to increase risky decision-making in
a driving task in older adults, but not in younger adults (Mather
et al., 2009), and a few studies have reported gender differences in
decision-making under stress (Preston et al., 2007; Lighthall et al.,
2009; van den Bos et al., 2009; Takahashi et al., 2010).
These mixed findings highlight the importance of considering
not only the presence of an acute stressor, but also how people per-
ceive and appraise stressful situations. A growing literature shows
that individuals may interpret stressful situations as either chal-
lenging or threatening, and that this might affect their choices (e.g.,
Kassam et al., 2009). The degree to which an individual tends to
perceive stressful situations as uncontrollable, unpredictable, and
severe can be measured by the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS; Cohen
et al., 1983). High scores on this measure have been associated
with blunted hedonic capacity (Pizzagalli et al., 2007), especially
in the presence of acute stress (Bogdan and Pizzagalli, 2006). This
decreased reward responsiveness may affect the way in which
immediate rewards are construed, and decisions are made, in a
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delay discounting paradigm. In the present study, we administered
the PSS in order to measure participants’ general perception of life
events as stressful. This trait perceived stress might represent an
important intermediary factor in the relationship between acute
stress and delay discounting; likewise, acute stress may mediate the
relationship between trait perceived stress and delay discounting.
In addition to varying in the way they are interpreted by the
individual, stressful situations may also vary in their time orienta-
tion. That is, they may be future-focused (e.g., thinking about
future encounters or job interviews) or present-focused (e.g.,
worrying about how one appears to others). Since intertempo-
ral choice involves making decisions about the future, and since
perception of time is an important factor in determining delay
discounting rates, it is critical to take into account how stress inter-
acts with time orientation to affect decisions involving delayed
rewards. Individuals who perceive future events as being farther
away in time are more likely to discount rewards at a higher rate
(Takahashi, 2005; Zauberman et al., 2009). In addition, prospec-
tion about future events has been found to reduce bias toward
immediate reward in delay discounting tasks (Peters and Buchel,
2010; Benoit et al., 2011). Prospection about future events in a
stressful context may have a different effect on delay discount-
ing, in that a bleak view of the future might invite a preference
for immediate reward. Likewise, stress that is present-focused may
decrease delay discounting rate by decreasing responsiveness to
immediate reward (Bogdan and Pizzagalli, 2006). In order to
control for effects of time orientation on delay discounting, we
included manipulations that varied in both stressfulness and time
orientation.
Another important consideration is the distinction between
risk-taking and delay discounting. While delay discounting carries
a risk-taking component (since future rewards may be interpreted
as uncertain), the inability to wait for future rewards is a well-
documented and well-defined dimension of impulsivity (Kirby
and Finch, 2010). Risk-taking is often found to be correlated
with preference for immediate reward (Reynolds et al., 2004), and
there may be similarities between the discounting functions for
delayed and probabilistic rewards (Rachlin et al., 1991; Green and
Myerson, 2004). However, probability discounting (i.e., tendency
for risk-taking) and delay discounting likely have distinct neural
underpinnings and mechanisms (Cardinal, 2006), and other vari-
ables may affect these two constructs differently (Green et al., 1999;
Green and Myerson,2004). Therefore, in order to examine whether
stress affects delay discounting, probability discounting, or both,
this study also included a choice paradigm in which participants
made decisions between certain and probabilistic rewards. Higher
probability discounting rates were indicative of greater risk-taking,
or a greater propensity to discount odds against receiving an
uncertain reward.
In summary, the current study explored the effects of acute
stress on delay discounting rate and probability discounting rate,
while taking into consideration individual differences in trait per-
ceived stress and time orientation of the stressor. Each of four
groups was treated with a different manipulation, designed to
induce some combination of time orientation and acute stress.
Additionally, PSS scores were collected for all participants. Due to
previously discussed evidence of reduced reward responsiveness
in high PSS individuals during acute stress exposure, we predicted
that delay discounting rate under stressful conditions would be
differentially affected in individuals with varying levels of trait
perceived stress.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
A total of 120 males participated in this experiment; they were ran-
domly assigned to each of the four groups. Smokers were excluded,
because smoking has been linked with high delay discounting
rates (Businelle et al., 2010), as well as increased base cortisol lev-
els (Kirschbaum et al., 1992). Only males were included because
of reported menstrual and contraceptive effects on cortisol levels
(Kudielka et al., 2004). Limiting analysis to one gender is a com-
mon approach in the stress and cognition literature (e.g., al’Absi
et al., 2002; Henckens et al., 2009). In addition, the experiment
was always conducted between the hours of 1:00 and 5:00 PM,
as stress levels have been shown to fluctuate throughout the day
(Izawa et al., 2010) and to control for circadian fluctuations in cir-
culating cortisol (Federenko et al., 2004). Seven individuals were
excluded from data analysis due to misunderstanding of instruc-
tions (n= 2), refusal to consent to video recording (n= 2), and
naïveté issues (i.e., having done a similar stress-induction study
previously; n= 3). Therefore, final analysis was conducted on
113 participants (mean age= 20.46 years, SD= 3.74). All partic-
ipants gave written, informed consent. They were compensated
with course credit, and all were aware that they might be selected
to perform a stressful speech-giving exercise while being video-
taped. The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board
of Rutgers University.
WORKING MEMORY TASK
Prior research has demonstrated that lower working memory
capacity may be related to increased delay discounting (Hinson
et al., 2003; Shamosh et al., 2008; Bobova et al., 2009). Thus, we
included a variant of the Sternberg item-recognition task (Stern-
berg, 1966), often used in past research to measure maintenance
of information in verbal working memory (Rypma et al., 2002;
Narayanan et al., 2005; Porcelli et al., 2008). Participants com-
pleted this task directly after a baseline cortisol measurement was
taken (for study timeline, see Figure 1). On each of forty trials,
subjects were presented with a string that was either three or six
letters in length. After a brief pause, they were shown a single ran-
dom letter and were asked to indicate whether or not this letter
had appeared in the previous string by pressing “1” (for “yes”) or
“2” (for “no”).
STRESS AND FUTURE ORIENTATION MANIPULATION
After the participants completed the working memory task, they
were told whether or not they had been randomly selected to give
a speech. In our factorial design, participants were exposed either
to acute stress in the form of anticipating a videotaped speech or
a non-stressful control procedure (Stress, Non-Stress). Addition-
ally, participants’ time orientation was manipulated to be either
future- or present-focused (Future, Present). Therefore, there were
four distinct manipulations, detailed below, which varied on these
two axes. The anticipatory stress manipulation was adapted from
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FIGURE 1 |Timeline for procedure.
a previous study on stress and decision-making (Preston et al.,
2007).
If the participants were in the future-oriented stress (FS) group,
they were told that they would be giving a 3-min speech in front of
a video camera. The speech would be recorded, and later viewed
and judged by the experimenters. The instructions for the speech
were, “Pretend that you are in front of an interview committee
for your future dream job. Talk about your strengths and weak-
nesses, and please explain why you should get this job despite
your weaknesses. You will be ranked relative to your peers based
on your articulation, clarity, defensiveness, openness, and organi-
zation.” The participants were then given 5 min to prepare their
speeches before the next task. This speech topic is commonly used
as part of the Trier Social Stress Test (Kirschbaum et al., 1993), a
manipulation that reliably elicits self-reported stress and cortisol
release.
In the present-oriented stress (PS) group, the instructions were
similar, but the topic of the speech was “Please talk about what you
dislike about your body and physical appearance.” It was empha-
sized that participants should focus only on physical traits. Preston
et al. (2007) found that this speech topic elicited stress in both men
and women.
Both stress conditions included a similar speech-giving exercise
that involved some level of social evaluative stress. We chose these
procedures because their validity and effectiveness in inducing
stress has been demonstrated in previous studies (e.g., Kirschbaum
et al., 1993; Preston et al., 2007). Although time orientation was
not the only factor that differed between the two conditions, we
did not want to make the time orientation manipulation trans-
parent to subjects, nor did we wish to include a new manipulation
that might not have been effective in inducing stress.
In the future-oriented non-stress (FN) group, participants were
told to relax and to make a list of events within the next 6 months
that they were looking forward to (e.g., school vacations).
If the participants were randomly selected to be in the present-
oriented non-stress (PN) group, they were asked to relax and sit
quietly while listening to music (Winston, 1984, track 4). Listening
to relaxing music is often used as a non-stressful control task in
studies that involve stress manipulation (e.g., van den Bos et al.,
2009).
DELAY AND PROBABILITY DISCOUNTING TASK
The delay and probability discounting task administered following
the stress and time orientation manipulations was a computer-
ized question-based measure used in past research to study choice
behavior (Richards et al., 1999). In the series of delay trials, partici-
pants were presented with questions asking about their preferences
between $10 to be received after one of the delays (1, 2, 30, 180, and
365 days) or a smaller amount (e.g., $2) to be received immedi-
ately. For each trial, they were instructed to click on the reward they
preferred. Time to choose was unlimited, and after each response
participants were asked, “Are you sure about your response?” If
they indicated uncertainty, they were permitted to go back to make
a different choice; if they were sure, the program continued to
the next question. For each delay, the immediate reward amount
was increased or decreased in value (±$0.50) based on previous
responses until an indifference value was reached. An indifference
value is defined as the smallest amount of money chosen to be
received immediately instead of waiting the specified delay in order
to receive the $10 standard. A random adjusting-amount proce-
dure was programmed to use the answers to previous questions
to restrict the range of values from which the immediate value for
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the next question was selected. This procedure was unlikely to be
transparent to participants, because delay trials were interspersed
with probability trials (see next section), and the algorithm for
determining the adjusted value for subsequent questions was not
readily predictable. No participant indicated that he detected the
adjusting nature of the task.
Interspersed with delay trials were probability trials. In these
trials, participants were presented with a choice between $10 to
be received at varying levels of probability (25, 50, 75, and 90%)
or a smaller amount with a 100% chance of receipt. As in the
delay trials, the smaller amount was increased or decreased in
value (±$0.50) based on previous responses until an indifference
value was reached. The initial adjusted value was randomized, and
the range of potential indifference values was restricted with every
response. An indifference value for each probability was defined as
the smallest amount of money chosen to be received with certainty
instead of taking the probabilistic $10. The task automatically ter-
minated once an indifference value was calculated for each delay
and for each probability (for more details on this procedure, see
Richards et al., 1999).
To increase the saliency and relevance of their choices, partici-
pants were told at the outset that one of their responses would be
randomly selected and that they would receive the amount they
chose at the delay specified, or with the probability specified. That
is, if they chose the immediate reward on the randomly selected
trial, they would receive the money as additional compensation
after the session; conversely, if they chose the larger,delayed reward,
they would receive the money either by mail, or by returning to
the laboratory, after the delay specified. If the randomly selected
trial was a probability trial, they would either receive a reward at
the end of the session (if they chose the “definite” option) or they
would draw a token from a bag containing two colors of tokens
in the proportion that reflected the probability of their selection,
thereby possibly receiving compensation at the end of the session.
After completing this procedure, participants were asked to rate
their certainties for receiving the delayed rewards (e.g.,“If you had
chosen the money delayed by 365 days, were you sure you would
actually get that money if it was the randomly selected answer?
How sure were you that you would get the money in 365 days if
you chose it?”; Richards et al., 1999).
Following this task, salivary cortisol was sampled (T2). Par-
ticipants in the stress condition were then asked to give the 3-
min speech, while participants in the non-stress condition were
informed of their winnings in the delay discounting task. Par-
ticipants in the stress condition were not informed about their
winnings until after the speech.
CORTISOL
Salivary free cortisol levels correspond well with plasma free corti-
sol levels. Therefore, collection of saliva is an easy and non-invasive
means to obtain an index of the biologically active fraction of
this hormone (Kirschbaum and Hellhammer, 1989). Participants
were instructed to refrain from eating and consuming caffeine
and alcohol for at least 2 h before study participation. Saliva sam-
ples were collected using Salimetrics Oral Swabs (SOS) after the
first set of questionnaires (T1) and approximately 20 min after
the stress manipulation (T2). Cortisol levels corresponding to the
stress response tend to peak at this time (Kirschbaum et al., 1993).
Subjects chewed on the SOS for about 60 s, after which they were
placed in vials and stored in a freezer until later processing. Cortisol
samples were assayed at Salimetrics, LLC (State College, PA, USA).
SELF-REPORT QUESTIONNAIRES
Self-report questionnaires administered at the beginning of the
experiment included the PSS (Cohen et al., 1983) and the Posi-
tive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988).
The PSS measures the degree to which situations in one’s life are
appraised as stressful (Cohen et al., 1983). Higher scores indi-
cate higher perceived stress in response to stressful situations. The
PANAS contains items that measure current negative affect and
positive affect. High negative affect is characterized by subjective
distress, nervousness, and overall unpleasant engagement. Positive
affect, on the other hand, represents the degree to which the indi-
vidual engages with the environment with positive emotions, such
as enthusiasm and alertness (Watson et al., 1988). Demographic
and income information were also collected at this time, and drug
and alcohol use were assessed. The first cortisol measurement was
taken as soon as these questionnaires were completed (T1).
Directly after the delay discounting task, participants com-
pleted the PANAS one more time. At the end of the experiment,
the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale Version 11 (BIS-11; Patton et al.,
1995) and a post-task questionnaire assessing stress during the
experiment were administered. The BIS-11 provides a measure of
real-world impulsivity (e.g., “I charge more than I earn”) and has
been found to possess satisfactory reliability and validity (Patton
et al., 1995).
RESULTS
DATA REDUCTION
The indifference values determined in the delay discounting task
were used to produce a delay discounting curve and to compute
the area under the curve (AUC; Myerson et al., 2001) for each sub-
ject. The indifference values and delay values (1, 2, 30, 180, and
365 days) were used as x-coordinates and y-coordinates, respec-
tively, to construct a graph of the discounting data. Vertical lines
were then drawn from each data point to the x-axis, subdividing
the graph into a series of trapezoids. The area of each trapezoid
is equal to (x2− x1)[(y1+ y2)/2], where x1 and x2 are succes-
sive delays, and y1 and y2 are the indifference values associated
with these delays (for the first trapezoid, the value of x1 and y1
are defined as 0 and 1). The area under the empirical discounting
function is equal to the sum of the areas of these trapezoids.
Area under the curve values range from 0 to 1; higher AUC
values indicate lower discounting by delay (i.e., a preference for
delayed, larger rewards), while lower AUC values correspond to
steeper, or more impatient, discounting (i.e., a preference for
smaller, more immediate rewards). The AUC served as the measure
of delay discounting rate in this study. As a theoretically neutral
measure of delay discounting, the AUC makes no explicit assump-
tions regarding the form of the indifference curve. In this way, it
is applicable to a wider range of indifference curves than other
quantitative models, such as hyperbolic or exponential delay dis-
counting models. This approach is common in studies of delay
discounting (e.g., Dixon et al., 2006; Shiels et al., 2009).
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For the probability choice data, AUC was also computed (Myer-
son et al., 2001), using indifference values for each probability
as the y-coordinate, and the odds against receiving a reward as
the x-coordinate. AUC was used as the measure of probability
discounting rate. Here, smaller area values indicate greater dis-
counting by odds against receiving a reward; therefore,participants
with lower AUC values were relatively risk-averse, while higher
AUC values indicated greater risk-taking behavior.
We tested for Pearson correlation between participants’ scores
on the working memory measure and delay discounting rate and
probability discounting rate, as well as between BIS-11 scores and
these variables. No significant relationships were found between
working memory capacity and delay discounting rate (r = 0.06,
p= 0.55) or probability discounting rate (r = 0.08, p= 0.41).
There were also no significant associations between scores on the
BIS-11 and delay discounting (r =−0.05, p= 0.64) or probability
discounting (r = 0.01, p= 0.96). Therefore, these variables were
dropped from further analyses.
EFFECTS OF ACUTE STRESS MANIPULATION
Two participants’ cortisol data were excluded due to sample con-
tamination, leaving 111 subjects in this analysis. There was an
effect of acute stress manipulation on change in cortisol from T1
to T2, with stress groups showing significantly greater increases
in cortisol than non-stress groups [F (1, 110)= 5.17, p= 0.025;
change in cortisol for future stress group: M = 0.005µg/dL,
SD= 0.116µg/dL, range: −0.28 to 0.28µg/dL; for present stress
group: M =−0.003µg/dL, SD= 0.073µg/dL, range: −0.19 to
0.14µg/dL; for present non-stress group: M =−0.04µg/dL,
SD= 0.068µg/dL, range: −0.2 to 0.17µg/dL; for future non-
stress group: M =−0.028µg/dL, SD= 0.053µg/dL, range:−0.19
to 0.06µg/dL]. There was also a main effect of stress manipulation
group on change in negative affect from T1 to T2 [F (1, 110)= 8.99,
p= 0.003], indicating presence of greater negative affect after the
stress manipulation than before it. There was no significant rela-
tionship between change in negative affect and change in cortisol,
neither across all subjects (r = 0.05, p= 0.60) nor for participants
in the stress groups (r =−0.04, p= 0.80). Not all participants
completed the post-task questionnaire, assessing the stressful-
ness of the manipulation; therefore, this explicit measure was not
considered in the manipulation check.
Between the two stress groups, FS and PS, no differences in cor-
tisol (t 54= 0.29, p= 0.77,) or negative affect (t 55= 1.09, p= 0.28)
were observed, implying that participants in these groups exhib-
ited similar stress reactivity associated with the two manipulations.
The groups did not differ with regard to changes in positive affect
(t 55= 1.23, p= 0.23) from pre- to post-manipulation. Further-
more, there were no differences in change in positive (t 54=−0.15,
p= 0.89) or negative affect (t 54=−0.93, p= 0.36) from T1 to T2
between the two non-stress groups, PN and FN, demonstrating
that they were similarly emotionally influenced by the non-stress
manipulations.
ACUTE STRESS INTERACTS WITH TRAIT PERCEIVED STRESS TO
AFFECT DELAY DISCOUNTING
To investigate how individual differences in trait perceived stress
might interact with acute stress to determine decision-making
patterns, a moderated multiple regression approach was used
(Aguinis, 2004). A one-way ANOVA indicated that PSS did not
significantly vary by group (F = 0.315, p= 0.814). Mean-centered
PSS scores, the dummy-coded acute stress exposure variable (non-
stress= comparison group), and the dummy-coded time orien-
tation variable (present= comparison group) were entered into
the first step of the regression, with the interaction term between
PSS score and acute stress manipulation entered in the second
step. Delay discounting rate and probability discounting rate were
entered as dependent variables in two separate analyses. This
analysis showed that the interaction between acute stress and PSS
significantly predicted delay discounting rate [PSS range: 8–43,
M = 23.56, SD= 6.57; ∆R2= 0.06, ∆F (1, 108)= 6.71, p= 0.016;
Figure 2], better than the model that included PSS, acute stress
exposure, and time orientation of the stressor. When including
certainty about receiving delayed rewards (as assessed by the post-
task questionnaire) as another control variable in the first step
of this analysis, the interaction remains significant (∆R2= 0.06,
∆F (1, 107)= 5.29, p= 0.007). Delay discounting was highest (i.e.,
AUC value is lowest) in individuals with low trait perceived stress
when they were under acute stress, and lowest for individuals with
high trait perceived stress when they were under acute stress. In the
first step of this regression, a model containing mean-centered PSS
scores and the dummy-coded acute stress exposure and time ori-
entation variables was not sufficient to predict delay discounting
rate (R2= 0.05,F (1, 109)= 1.80, p= 0.15). The multiple regression
analysis revealed null results when probability discounting rate was
entered as a dependent variable [∆R2= 0.01, ∆F (1, 108)= 0.230,
p= 0.19].
As a confirmatory analysis, a three-way ANOVA was performed,
with Time Orientation (Future, Present), Acute Stress (Stress,
Non-Stress), and median-split PSS score (High PSS, Low PSS) as
factors, and with delay discounting rate as the dependent variable.
There were no significant main effects of any of the factors, but the
interaction between PSS score group and acute stress group was
significant [F (1, 112)= 5.188, p= 0.025].
FIGURE 2 | Mean delay discounting rates for individuals with PSS
scores 1 standard deviation above and below the mean, stratified by
stress manipulation group (Stress, Non-stress; N =113). There is a
significant interaction of acute stress manipulation and trait perceived stress
level on delay discounting rate (AUC). Higher AUC values indicate lower
delay discounting rates (i.e., more later/larger rewards chosen). When no
stress is present, participants with differences in trait perceived stress make
similar choices on the delay discounting paradigm. When faced with an
acute stressor, subjects with high PSS scores discount rewards at a lower
rate, and subjects with lower PSS scores exhibit increased discounting.
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EFFECT OF TIME ORIENTATION AND ACUTE STRESS ON IMMEDIATE
REWARD BIAS
In a 2× 2 ANOVA, the effects of stress [F (1, 112)= 1.36, p= 0.25]
and time orientation manipulation on choices about probabilis-
tic rewards in this paradigm did not reach significance [although
there was a trend for future orientation; F (1, 112)= 3.63, p= 0.06].
There was no overall significant effect of future orientation on
delay discounting rate [F (1, 112)= 0.37, p= 0.55], nor was there an
overall effect of acute stress [F (1, 112)= 0.55, p= 0.46]. All inter-
actions were also non-significant [for probability discounting:
F (1, 112)= 1.25, p= 0.27; for delay discounting: F (1, 112)= 0.41,
p= 0.53].
Due to evidence that future-thinking manipulations can
decrease delay discounting rate (e.g., Benoit et al., 2011), the
lack of a significant relationship between time orientation and
delay discounting rate in this study was puzzling. Thus, in an
additional analysis, we quantified participants’ immediate reward
bias, by calculating the choice index, or the ratio of the fre-
quency of immediate reward options chosen to all options cho-
sen (Boettiger et al., 2007; Benoit et al., 2011) for each sub-
ject. This immediate reward bias measure is distinct from the
delay discounting rate, since it reflects participants’ overarch-
ing preference for immediate reward, regardless of the delay
intervals. Past studies (e.g., Ebert and Prelec, 2007) have shown
that manipulations of time sensitivity may affect choices for
the near-future and far-future differently, thereby changing delay
discounting in a way that might not be captured by the AUC
measure.
A 2× 2 ANOVA was conducted with Time Orientation (Future,
Present) and Acute Stress (Stress, Non-Stress) as factors and
immediate reward bias as the dependent variable. No significant
main effect of future orientation on the percentage of immedi-
ate reward choices was observed [F (1, 112)= 0.47, p= 0.50], nor
was there a main effect of acute stress [F (1, 112)= 0.88, p= 0.35].
However, there was a significant interaction between time ori-
entation manipulation and stress manipulation [F (1, 112)= 56.63,
p< 0.001; Figure 3], whereby immediate reward bias was high-
est when a future-oriented situation was stressful (FS) or a
present-oriented situation was non-stressful (PN), and it was low-
est when a future-oriented situation was non-stressful (FN) or
a present-oriented situation was stressful (PS). Post hoc t -tests
revealed that the PN group exhibited significantly higher imme-
diate reward bias than the PS group (t 55= 4.44, p< 0.001) and
the FN group (t 54= 4.61, p< 0.001). In addition, the FS group
demonstrated higher immediate reward bias than the PS group
(t 55= 6.10, p< 0.001) and the FN group (t 54= 6.34, p< 0.001).
There were no differences between the FS and PN groups in
immediate reward bias (t 52=−0.16,p= 0.87), nor was there a sig-
nificant difference between the FN and PS groups on this measure
(t 55= 1.18, p= 0.24). The ANOVA remains significant even after
entering certainty about receiving future rewards as a covariate
[F (1, 111)= 55.82, p< 0.001]. However, we found that participants
in the PS group were significantly less certain that they would
receive a reward after 365 days than members of the other groups
(compared to FN: t =−2.63, p< 0.05; FS: t =−2.09, p< 0.05;
PN: t =−2.04,p< 0.05). This difference between groups is worthy
of note.
FIGURE 3 | Means of immediate reward bias (i.e., percentage of
immediate options chosen) for each group (Future Stress, Future
Non-stress, Present Stress, Present Non-stress). There is a significant
interaction between time orientation manipulation and acute stress
manipulation on this variable [N = 112; F (1, 111) =56.63, p<0.001], showing
that future orientation increases choices for immediate reward when the
stressor is present, but decreases immediate reward bias when the
stressor is absent.
This finding should be interpreted with caution, as the percent-
age of immediate rewards chosen was strongly correlated with the
number of choices that participants faced in this staircase para-
digm (r = 0.609, p< 0.001). Indeed, if the first immediate reward
amount randomly generated by the task was very high, then it
would have been more likely to be followed by more immediate
reward choices; if the first number was low, then there would be
fewer immediate choices at the beginning. This source of noise is
potentially problematic, but due to its random nature, it is unlikely
to be at the root of group differences. It is plausible, however, that
another mechanism (such as more consistent choices among sub-
jects in the FN and PS groups) may be driving this effect. To
investigate this possibility further, we fit a q-exponential model to
the data to determine estimates of q (inconsistency) and kq (delay
discounting rate) using R statistical language (www.r-project.org).
This function is based on Tsallis’ statistics, and was computed as:
V (D) = A/[1 + (1− q) kqD]1/(1−q) (1)
where A is the amount of the reward at D, D is the delay to
reward, kq is a parameter of delay discounting at delay D, and
the q parameter can be used to assess a subject’s consistency in
intertemporal choice (Cajueiro, 2006; Takahashi et al., 2007). Note
that Eq. 1 is equivalent to the simple hyperbolic discount func-
tion [V (D)=A/(1+ kD)] when q= 0. Critically, in the current
dataset, the q-exponential function could not be fitted in 26 par-
ticipants due to an infinity value. After excluding these subjects, a
one-way ANOVA revealed no group differences in the consistency
parameter q (F = 0.513; p= 0.679) or in the discounting parame-
ter kq (F = 0.487;p= 0.692). The lack of quantifiable differences in
consistency between groups indicates that this finding most likely
arises from a change in bias toward immediate reward. However,
in this staircase procedure, it is important to bear in mind that the
immediate reward bias index is a less reliable measure than AUC.
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EFFECT OF CORTISOL ON DELAY DISCOUNTING
Collapsing across all groups, there was a significant negative corre-
lation between change in cortisol concentration from T1 to T2 and
delay discounting AUC (r =−0.19; p< 0.05), whereby higher dis-
counting of delayed rewards (smaller AUC) was associated with a
larger increase in cortisol after the manipulation. That is, individ-
uals who experienced an increase in cortisol, regardless of manip-
ulation, were more likely to select smaller, sooner rewards. When
inspecting the stress groups only, however, this relationship does
not hold (r =−0.16, p= 0.23), although the direction of the effect
is the same. There was no significant relationship between change
in cortisol and probability discounting (r =−0.06; p= 0.512), or
with immediate reward bias (r = 0.14; p= 0.16).
DISCUSSION
Many decisions are made under stressful circumstances, includ-
ing decisions in which small, immediate rewards are weighed
against larger, delayed rewards. The results of the present study
carry strong implications regarding the effects of acute stress on
intertemporal choice. In this investigation, we found that the
interaction between trait perceived stress and acute stress had a
significant effect on rate of delay discounting, regardless of the
time orientation of the stressor. Based on our findings, we can
conclude that individuals with high and low trait perceived stress
made different choices when faced with acute stress. Those who
are more likely to perceive stressful situations as such show a pref-
erence for larger, delayed rewards, while those with low perceived
stress discount delayed rewards at a higher rate. When there was
no acute stressor present, individuals who differed in PSS lev-
els made similar choices in this paradigm. It is possible, then, that
individual differences in stress appraisal may affect reward respon-
siveness under stress. When these same analyses were performed
on probabilistic choice data, null effects were observed.
The finding that choices under stress were differentially affected
by a priori level of trait perceived stress speaks to the complexity
of stress as a construct, and the importance of studying indi-
vidual differences in this domain. The challenge versus threat
literature on stress (Blascovich and Tomaka, 1996; see also Henry,
1980; Frankenhaeuser, 1986) differentiates“good stress”from“bad
stress” during active, goal-relevant tasks. Whether an individual
perceives a stressful situation as a challenge or a threat may affect
the decisions that one makes in such a situation (e.g., Kassam
et al., 2009). In addition, the perceived controllability of a stressor
can influence executive functioning under stress (Henderson et al.,
2012). A plausible mechanism in the current study is that those
who are more likely to perceive situations as stressful are more
likely to interpret the stress manipulation as threatening. Accord-
ingly, they might experience a decrease in their reward response
to immediate reward and make more delayed reward choices. This
decrease in reward responsiveness has been documented in pre-
vious studies (Bogdan and Pizzagalli, 2006), and the association
between blunted reward response and reduced delay discounting
has also been found previously (Lempert and Pizzagalli, 2010).
Those with low trait perceived stress, on the other hand, may feel
more control over the stressor, and even see the situation as a
challenge with a positive valence. Thus, they may experience an
increased immediate reward response and choose more immediate
rewards. In addition, high trait perceived stress has been shown
to be hereditary (Bogdan and Pizzagalli, 2009) and associated
with a serotonin transporter genotype that is linked with depres-
sion following stress (Otte et al., 2007). Given serotonin’s role in
delay discounting processes (Schweighofer et al., 2008), the inter-
play between serotonin levels, stress, and decision-making is an
interesting future avenue of research.
In this study, we also found that the interaction between time
orientation and acute stress had a significant effect on bias toward
immediate reward. Participants tended to make far-sighted choices
when they experienced present stress or when they thought about
the future in a stress-free light. Conversely, when participants
thought about a future situation that was stressful (in this case,
a future job interview), they showed a greater preference for
immediate – albeit smaller – rewards. These findings suggest that
induction of a future orientation is not sufficient to reduce delay
discounting rate. Past studies that have found an effect of prospec-
tion on discounting rate (Peters and Buchel, 2010; Benoit et al.,
2011) focused only on positive future events. Framing a future
situation as stressful, however, might precipitate a bleak view of
the future, which, in turn, shifts a participant’s motivation toward
increasing immediate reward. Changes in mood might be involved
in this process (Hirsh et al., 2010; Augustine and Larsen, 2011).
In our study, it is impossible to disentangle effects of mood from
effects of stress; in fact, negative affect increased significantly more
for all participants who underwent a stress manipulation relative
to those in the non-stress conditions.
Another methodological limitation of our study is that there
might be differences between our future non-stress and present
non-stress groups independent of time orientation itself (e.g.,
arousal state may be different for listing positive future events
than for listening to music). Similarly, there may be differences
between the stress groups that are unrelated to time orientation;
in the present stress condition, participants are socially evaluated
for more superficial qualities (physical appearance), whereas in
the future stress condition, they are evaluated for deeper qualities.
Although there were no significant differences between the two
stress conditions in cortisol increase,participants may have also felt
more stressed in the present stress condition, due to the uncontrol-
lability of the speech topic (subjects had more freedom to choose
a topic in the “future job” speech condition). The aim of the cur-
rent study was to investigate the effects of acute stress on delay
discounting, while controlling for the potential confound of time
orientation. Therefore, statistical differences in decision-making
based on time orientation should be interpreted with caution.
Future studies are warranted to further clarify the contributions
of time orientation and stress to delay discounting.
While future orientation and stress, in combination, affected
immediate reward bias, they did not have any effect on rate of
delay discounting. This finding is unusual, given that these two
variables were derived from the same choice procedure, and that
they are correlated (r =−0.604, p< 0.01). However, the percent-
age of small-immediate rewards chosen does not fully represent
an individual’s tendency to choose more proximal rewards versus
more distal ones. Only delay discounting rate takes into account
the various delays used in the paradigm, which ranged from 1
to 365 days. It is possible that certain manipulations, such as
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our future orientation manipulation, may induce an ephemeral
tendency toward choosing either immediate or future rewards,
without affecting the more stable variable of discounting rate,
characterized in this study by AUC. For example, Ebert and Prelec
(2007) found that manipulations of time sensitivity affected the
valuation of near-future and far-future rewards differently.
With our AUC measure of delay discounting, it is not clear
if the differences reported above are due to effects on the dis-
count parameter (i.e., to what degree are sooner rewards valued
more than later rewards), or effects on the participants’ utility
functions (i.e., how the objective reward amounts correspond to
participants’ subjective values). Previous studies have found that
delay discounting behavior can be explained by a combination
of diminishing marginal utility and preference for sooner reward
(Andersen et al., 2008; Pine et al., 2009). It is also possible that
our manipulations influenced time perception in these subjects,
which then modulated their delay discounting (Takahashi, 2005;
Zauberman et al., 2009). Future research will be necessary to clar-
ify the effects of stress on time perception, marginal utility, and
time discounting.
Stress hormones, such as cortisol, are known to influence a
number of brain regions related to decision-making. They seem
to impair prefrontal cortex (PFC) function and executive control
(Hains and Arnsten, 2008), but they activate different receptors
in PFC depending on the level of stress, and depending on the
time of day (see Lupien et al., 2007 for a review). One limitation
of the current study is that, even though we always conducted the
study in the afternoon, we did not assess participants’ sleep habits.
Acute stress might affect glucocorticoid activity in early risers and
late-risers differently; furthermore, late-risers and early risers may
differ in their decision-making patterns (e.g., Tonetti et al., 2010).
However, all participants in the study were students, and most had
similar class schedules, so it is unlikely that their sleeping patterns
varied widely. Stress hormones can also impair hippocampal func-
tion and neurogenesis (McEwen, 1999). White matter volume in
the hippocampus has been shown to be positively associated with
delay discounting rate (Yu, 2012), and the hippocampus is involved
in future-directed thinking during delay discounting (Peters and
Buchel, 2010). Determining the relationship between stress, hip-
pocampal activity, and delay discounting is a promising avenue for
future research.
Unlike previous studies on stress and decision-making (e.g.,
Porcelli and Delgado, 2009), we found no significant effect of
acute stress on choices in the probability portion of the decision-
making paradigm. However, differences in experimental proce-
dures, including stress application and actual paradigm, might be
responsible for this discrepancy. In contrast with many risk-taking
tasks, in our task, participants made decisions about a large range
of probabilities under no time pressure. There were also no cor-
relations found between delay discounting and working memory
capacity or BIS-11 scores, but these null findings are unsurprising,
since this study examined manipulations of delay discounting, and
not trait delay discounting. That is, any correlations across all par-
ticipants may have been overwhelmed by larger, between-group
differences.
The inclusion of males only in this study can be seen as both a
strength and a limitation. While it is a standard practice in stress
research, and we were able to rule out gender effects on the hor-
monal data, gender differences have been observed in studies that
utilize stress manipulations (Preston et al., 2007; Lighthall et al.,
2009; van den Bos et al., 2009; Takahashi et al., 2010). Because
gender is an important variable of interest in studies of stress and
decision-making, we felt that excluding its consideration in this
already complex study was warranted. It is premature, however,
to generalize our results about the effects of stress on decision-
making in this sample to the general population; future studies
should aim to uncover gender differences if they exist.
The present study provides important evidence that a general
outlook toward stress can affect decision-making under stress. This
finding is relevant to the prevention of substance dependence and
other disorders of impulsivity (e.g., attention deficit/hyperactivity
disorder, pathological gambling). Both high delay discounting
(Yoon et al., 2007; Harty et al., 2011) and stress (Sinha, 2001) have
been shown to be vulnerability factors for addiction and relapse. It
has also been hypothesized that stress might elicit suicidal behavior
and other impulsive behaviors in depression, through modulation
of delay discounting (Takahashi, 2011). By addressing how indi-
viduals handle stress, and manipulating the way that immediate
rewards are perceived under stress, it may be possible to intervene
in the development of maladaptive and dangerous behaviors.
In conclusion, the presence of acute stress interacts with general
perceived stress to influence discounting of delayed rewards. Fur-
thermore, future orientation and acute anticipatory stress show
interactive effects on bias toward immediate reward. Whether one
is contemplating the present or the future during intertemporal
choice affects the likelihood with which one chooses immediate
rewards, but this effect is tempered by the stressfulness of the con-
text. Countless crucial decisions are made under stress every day.
The current findings add to our understanding of the mediating
factors that act between acute stress and decision-making.
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